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abstract: This paper argues that the recent renewal of interest in the philosophy of 
Oswald Spengler, particularly concerning its warnings of the imminent demise of 
Western Civilisation, is misplaced . Arguments concerning the accuracy of his predic-
tions or cultural analysis have overlooked the necessity of evaluating the coherence 
of the philosophical system that Spengler used to generate and justify his speculative 
declarations . Such an evaluation indicates a number of apparent contradictions at 
the heart of Spengler’s historical model . The attempt to resolve these contradictions 
has resulted in a sharp division of interpretation amongst Spengler commentators, 
into positivist and relativist camps . Neither interpretation, I suggest, is capable of 
rendering Spengler’s historical system coherent . It is therefore argued that Spengler’s 
philosophy is fundamentally flawed .
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1. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of popular interest in the theories 
of Oswald Spengler, author of The Decline of the West . Many a journalistic 
thinkpiece now begins with a portentous quotation from Spengler’s 1918 
tome or a reference to its invocation of an atmosphere of crisis and disorder .1 
This interest, sparked largely by political events in europe, has tended to 
focus on themes concerning the life-span of cultures and the imminent death 
of Western Civilisation, which in turn are founded upon Spengler’s cyclical 
1 See for instance Bew (2017), Kaplan (2018), Leuck (2017, 2018), Newcomb (2018) 
and Samadder (2018) .
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model of world-history and the ‘laws’ derived therefrom . In the present day, 
as at the time of the publication of the Decline, most analyses of the merits of 
Spengler’s philosophy have tended to focus on the credibility of the empirical 
support for his models and prognostications, or the desirability (or otherwise) 
of its political implications . This paper makes no attempt to intervene at this 
level of the debate around, effectively, the question of the contemporary rel-
evance of Spengler’s work . This paper will instead take a different critical tack 
and will consider the conceptual coherence of Spengler’s historical model . 
The reason for this is as follows: it is upon the viability of Spengler’s historico-
philosophical model of world history that his cultural criticism and historical 
prognostications depend . And yet, I argue, the coherence of this model has 
yet to be examined adequately .
Turning to the secondary literature one is soon struck by the marked 
lack of consensus on the correct interpretation of Spengler’s model . Stand-
ard accounts of Spengler’s philosophy tend to favour either a positivist or a 
relativist interpretation, neither of which is compatible with the other . This 
interpretative dichotomy, I argue, stems not from Spengler’s opacity but from 
a paradox embedded at the heart of his theory concerning the possibility of 
inter-cultural comparisons .
The tension in Spengler commentary revolves around the issue of 
whether Spengler’s philosophy of history should be understood objectively, 
as a science of history that seeks to uncover universal and observable law-like 
regularities in the course of history (the positivist view), or subjectively, as a 
culture-specific expression of a perspectival historical aesthetics (the relativist 
view) .2
2 Since Spengler’s work first appeared in english in 1926 there have only been three 
major academic works published in english on his philosophy of history . The first, Oswald 
Spengler: A Critical Estimate by historian of ideas H . Stuart Hughes was published in 1952, the 
second, History and Prophecy by Klaus P . Fischer in 1989, and the third, Prophet of Decline by 
John Farrenkopf in 2001 . The majority of material that I draw upon to construct what I term 
the received view on Spengler’s philosophy of history comes from articles and book chapters 
from the last century . However, in my defence I would point out that judging from Speng-
ler’s rare appearances in recent secondary literature there have not been any radical changes 
in Spengler interpretation since the 1930s . What differentiates recent articles on Spengler 
from those of the last century has more to do with the current belief that the later writings 
of Spengler differ sufficiently from the earlier ones that one might speak of two Spenglerian 
philosophies of history, than with any alterations in interpretation of the (early) philosophy 
of history put forward in Decline . Farrenkopf ’s depiction of Spengler’s philosophy in his 2001 
book does not differ that greatly from that of Hughes’s in 1952, and the brief mentions of 
Spengler’s work in current reference works or journal articles tend to simply recapitulate cer-
tain of the five key elements (section 2), mainly the portrayal of cultures as organisms and the 
predictive powers of the laws of history . See for instance Berry (2009), Breisach (2003), Kelley 
(2006), or Daniel Little’s entry for the Philosophy of History in the Stanford encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy .
139G . MORGAN SWeR:  Timely Meditations?
I shall consider the relativist and positivist interpretations of Spengler’s 
philosophy of history, and those positions that attempt to integrate both the 
positivist and relativist interpretations, and will evaluate their efforts to pro-
duce a coherent account of Spengler’s philosophy of history . I will argue that, 
whilst some attempts are more successful than others, ultimately all attempts 
at forming Spengler’s historical views into a coherent philosophical position 
tend to founder on what I term the comparative paradox, Spengler’s apparent 
use of the comparative analysis of cultures to justify his universal predictive 
laws of history and his insistence on the relativity of all historical conscious-
ness and all historical ‘truths’ .
A positivist reading requires that such comparison be possible, whilst a 
relativist reading tends to require that it be impossible . And yet, to validate 
either interpretation results in the loss of much of what makes Spengler’s phi-
losophy distinctive, such as his claims to have discovered the laws of historical 
development, or his statements concerning the irrevocability of Western cul-
tural decline . In other words, it seems that one can only navigate this internal 
contradiction within Spengler’s philosophy of history by doing violence to 
one or more central elements of his thought . Neither a positivist or relativist 
reading of Spengler is viable, I suggest, nor are other intermediate positions 
between either interpretative poles . I conclude by arguing that, regardless of 
its alleged ‘prescience’ concerning the fate of the West, Spengler’s philosophy 
is fundamentally flawed and internally incoherent .
2. The Received View
In this section I outline the key elements of the received view on Spengler’s 
philosophy of history . Given the notable amount of disagreement amongst 
Spengler’s commentators on the relative importance of certain aspects of his 
philosophy of history and their order of conceptual priority, this account 
is not meant to be either comprehensive or prescriptive . Rather it seeks to 
identify those points or themes that most commentators would agree to be 
central to Spengler’s position:
1) Cyclical Model: Spengler holds that human history in general (as op-
posed to the history of particular peoples or cultures) has an overall 
pattern, namely the rise and fall of individual cultures .
2) Culture-Organisms: Spengler argues that cultures, like organisms, 
have a life-cycle and that each culture (barring the intervention of 
external forces) must necessarily pass through the same stages (birth, 
maturity, senescence, death) .
3) Destiny: Spengler claims that the cyclical pattern of world history is 
formed by the operation of ‘destiny’, by which he means the fixed 
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laws of internal development that govern the development of cul-
ture-organisms .
4) Cultural Isolation: Spengler insists that each culture is autochthonous . 
That is to say that it is entirely self-originating and original with 
regards to its cultural content . each culture comes into being and 
departs without imparting or receiving any cultural content from or 
to other contemporaneous, preceding or succeeding cultures .
5) Meaning: Spengler argues that, despite exhibiting a cyclical pattern, 
human history is ultimately aimless and without meaning .
Standard analyses of Spengler’s general philosophical outlook tend to 
define his views as either positivist or relativist . Thus, he is either an heir of 
Comte seeking the universal laws of historical change, or he is a relativist of 
a (usually) Nietzschean stripe describing a universe of pure flux devoid of 
meaning and purpose except as an aesthetic spectacle . Moving on to the ques-
tion of the implications of Spengler’s philosophy of history, those who incline 
towards the view of Spengler as a positivist argue that as Spengler held that 
there are laws of human history and that he had discovered them, then his-
torical truth (in the sense of universally valid laws) is not merely possible but 
actual . Those who support the relativist interpretation, on the other hand, 
argue that Spengler held that all truths are necessarily relative to a particular 
culture-organism and hold no truth value outside those cultures . Thus, there 
can be no universal historical truths, only historically limited local truths 
based upon the perspective of a specific culture .
Turning now to the question of the internal coherence of Spengler’s posi-
tion, it is by no means obvious how it might be the case that historical truth 
is both objective and perspectival, universal and local . In light of this appar-
ent and rather obvious incompatibility, it then seems unlikely that Spengler 
intended his philosophy of history to support both a positivist and relativist 
historical outlook . In other words, it seems most improbable that Spengler 
intended his philosophy to be conceptually contradictory in this manner . And 
yet, as we shall see, there is material in Decline that appears to support both 
the positivist and the relativist interpretation . Much of the debate among 
commentators over Spengler’s philosophy of history, I suggest, is the attempt 
to resolve the apparent contradictions in Spengler’s philosophical outlook 
in favour of one interpretation or the other .3 In the following sections I will 
3 It should be noted that much of the academic commentary on Spengler takes no posi-
tion whatsoever on the issue of whether Spengler’s philosophy of history is relativist or posi-
tivist . Much of it takes the form of surveys of his work of the type usually found in reference 
works and, whilst not necessarily uncritical in tone, if these works do take issue with Spengler’s 
historical outlook it tends to be with its supposed pessimism (Cook 1963), its political impli-
cations (Lewis 1927, Heller 1952, Stuchtey 2012), faulty logic (Fischer 1970) or the historical 
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detail the major arguments of both the proponents of the positivist and the 
relativist positions, before arguing for a possibility not explicitly entertained 
by most commentators, namely that Spengler’s philosophy of history is prima 
facie contradictory .
3. Spengler as Positivist
The key support for a positivist interpretation is Spengler’s self-declared in-
tention to furnish the reader with the laws of human history . The first line 
of the introduction to Decline reads, “(i)n this book is attempted for the first 
time the venture of predetermining history, of following the still untravelled 
stages in the destiny of a Culture” (Spengler 1926: 3) . Armed with his con-
cept of cultures as organisms with a fixed lifecycle Spengler locates current 
Western civilisation at a particular stage of the recurrent pattern of cultural 
development and plots its future trajectory . He states that, “our own time 
represents a transitional phase which occurs with certainty under particular 
conditions, there are perfectly well-defined states (such as have occurred more 
than once in the history of the past) later than the present-day state of West 
europe”, therefore “(t)he future of the West is… but a single phenomenon of 
history, strictly limited and defined as to form and duration, which covers a 
few centuries and can be viewed and, in essentials, calculated from available 
precedents” (Spengler 1926: 39) .4 History for Spengler becomes the analysis 
of past regularities in the development of cultures and the use of these regu-
larities to predict the future . “(H)istory,” he claims, “offers possibilities far 
beyond the ambitions of all previous research, … namely, of overpassing the 
present as a research-limit, and predetermining the spiritual form, duration, 
rhythm, meaning and product of the still unaccomplished stages of our west-
ern history” (Spengler 1926: 112) .
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that some commentators should con-
clude that Spengler is proposing what amounts to a science of history . Gar-
diner describes Spengler simply as a “so-called ‘scientific historian’” (Gardiner 
1952: 22) . Collingwood refers to Spengler’s outlook as “positivistic natural-
ism” and his historical system as a “naturalistic science” (Collingwood 1961: 
evidence that Spengler used to support his system (Chisholm 1935, Santayana 1957, Walsh 
1967, Berlin 2000, Kelley 2003) rather than its philosophical orientation .
4 Regarding Spengler’s use of the term ‘later’, Spengler holds that each culture follows a 
fixed sequence of developmental stages . Once one has identified which stage in the sequence 
Western civilisation currently occupies, one can then speak of ‘later’ stages in the cycle and of 
those stages in other historically prior cultures . As Spengler puts it, “I designate as contempo-
rary two historical facts that occur in exactly the same – relative – positions in their respective 
Cultures” (Spengler 1926: 112) . In this way Spengler can speak of the Kantians and the epi-
cureans, or Napoleon and Alexander as contemporaries .
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181) . In addition to the search for general laws of history, and the desire to 
predict the future scientifically, Collingwood also identifies Spengler’s com-
mitment to “external analysis” as “openly positivistic” (Collingwood 1961: 
181–2) . even Hughes, one of Spengler’s most sympathetic critics who him-
self favours the relativist interpretation of Spengler’s philosophy of history, 
concedes that, “many of his historical preconceptions were naively and una-
shamedly positivist” (Hughes 1952: 55) . The positivist interpretation also 
receives considerable support from the tables in Decline which outline the 
supposed results of Spengler’s morphology of history . each table has a col-
umn for Indian, Classical (Greco-Roman), Arabian and Western culture, and 
each table sets out chronologically the structurally isomorphic features of the 
spiritual, cultural and political development of each culture at each stage of 
the cultural lifecycle from Spring to Winter . The “ageing process”, as Dray 
puts it, follows an “identical pattern” in each culture and each stage in one 
culture has an “exact correspondence” with the equivalent stage in another 
(Dray 1980: 107) .
4. Spengler as Relativist
The relativist interpretation of Spengler’s philosophy of history lays stress 
on Spengler’s views on the temporality and perspectival nature of historical 
truths . Spengler argued that, “there are no eternal truths”, only truths rela-
tive to a particular culture-organism (Spengler 1926: 41) . These truths are 
not shared by the members of other cultures, nor are they transmissible be-
tween cultures (this is Spengler’s cultural isolation thesis) . These truths arise 
only within one particular culture and with the demise of that culture these 
truths also perish . The historical implication of this outlook, for many com-
mentators, is a thoroughgoing scepticism about the universality, and very 
possibility, of historical truth . The consequence of this position, according to 
Mazlish, is “the elimination of the possibility of ‘history-in-itself ’ . There are 
only various perspectives on history, enjoyed by each culture” (Mazlish 1966: 
327) . History cannot produce generalising laws .5 As all values are specific to 
a particular culture, the understanding of other cultures will always be either 
extremely partial or impossible . It is an aspect of the human condition that 
one is never able to transcend one’s own time . Referring to this outlook, 
Iggers states that, “(c)onstant in the flow of time are only the conditions of 
5 It is for this reason that several commentators have described Spengler’s outlook as 
anti-positivistic . Farrenkopf locates Spengler’s thought “in the German historicist tradition 
of antipositivism” in that he “denies the existence of historical laws” (Farrenkopf 2001: 22) . 
Mazlish, similarly, sees Spengler’s critique and abandonment of the Comtean tripartite scheme 
of historical development and the very notion of progressive linear historical development as 
anti-positivist (Mazlish 1966: 326–7) .
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human existence, and these no longer possess any content, but were merely a 
structure or form” . He adds that for more “radical thinkers”, amongst whom 
he includes Spengler, “the historicity of man spelled the anarchy of values” 
(Iggers 1984: 244) .6 For, as Hughes observes, according to Spengler “the 
members of one culture cannot understand the basic ideas of another, and 
when they think they are doing so, they are actually translating totally alien 
concepts into concepts they have developed on their own” (Hughes 1952: 
73) . Thus, there could never be universal laws of history, let alone predictions 
based upon those laws .
Further encouraging a relativist reading of his philosophy of history, it 
should be noted that Spengler applies the implications of this thoroughgoing 
relativism with regards to truth, not just to history and philosophy in general, 
but also to his own thought . Farrenkopf states that, “with logical consistency, 
Spengler argues that his philosophy of world history is only valid as an intel-
lectual expression of the civilisation stage of the Faustian cycle” (Farrenkopf 
2001: 44) . Spengler acknowledges that his philosophy of history is itself cul-
turally relative, and imbued with the values of Western civilisation . The cycli-
cal system of the rise and fall of culture-organisms is, he says, “the picture of 
world-history that is natural to us, men of the West, and to us alone” (Spengler 
1926: 26) . His own philosophy of history, with its cyclical model of cultural 
change, is itself only possible within the late stages of Western civilisation and 
is comprehensible only to members of his own culture . It too has no claim to 
universal or historically transcendental truth, and it too will perish at the end 
of Western culture along with all other Western cultural products .
5. Either/or: Resolving the Contradiction
Both the relativist and the positivist interpretations draw support from Spen-
gler’s Decline and yet it would appear that they cannot both be correct unless 
Spengler’s philosophy is inconsistent . The relativist interpretation under-
stands Spengler to be arguing that, owing to the division between the ‘world 
as Nature’ and the ‘world as History’, historical thinking is sui generis . The 
history of cultures cannot be approached systematically and objectively in a 
scientific fashion . Rather, access to the truths of a culture requires the posses-
sion of that culture’s Ur-symbol, the quasi-Kantian cultural a priori, and an 
intuitive understanding, or ‘physiognomic tact’ .7 Historical truth is relative 
6 In other words, it is in the nature of humanity that humanity has no nature, only a 
history, or rather, histories .
7 Spengler writes that, “(s)ympathy, observation, comparison, immediate and inward 
certainty, intellectual flair – … these are the means of historical research – precisely these and no 
others” (Spengler 1926: 25) .
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to one’s location within a particular culture-organism and, in that sense, all 
history is contemporary history in that one cannot write history from outside 
one’s own cultural vantage point . Thus, all history is necessarily perspectival . 
The positivist interpretation, by contrast, takes Spengler to be claiming that 
whilst history, as a topic of investigation, is of a different kind to that ad-
dressed by the natural sciences, it is still possible to formulate historical laws 
by building up a system of observed regularities and showing how they exem-
plify a general law . These laws are objectively valid, culturally transcendent 
and enable the prediction of future developments in human history . Faced 
with this apparent contradiction, commentators on Spengler’s philosophy of 
history have developed several strategies to resolve the problem .8
5.1. Pure Relativism
For those commentators who favour a relativist interpretation, a first option 
is to dismiss the positivistic elements in Spengler’s philosophy of history all 
together . This can be done by explaining away Spengler’s nomothetic mo-
ments as metaphors that were never meant to be taken literally . For example, 
Collingwood, who read Spengler as a positivist, takes Spengler to task for his 
positivistic attitude to historical facts, and his comments apply just as well to 
his account of culture-organisms . They are, Collingwood argues, “positivisti-
cally conceived as isolated from each other instead of growing organically out 
of each other, … each with a fixed internal structure, but each related to the 
other non-historically . Their only interrelations are (a) temporal and spatial, 
(b) morphological” (Collingwood 1961: 182) . Frye, who favours a relativ-
ist reading, defuses criticism of Spengler’s positivism (like Collingwood’s) by 
describing Spengler’s cyclical laws as an “illusion” that neither implies nor 
necessitates “a mechanical principle” (Frye 1974: 5) . Cook ‘de-positivises’ 
Spengler’s account of culture-organisms, the prime units of historical analy-
sis, in the same manner as Frye: Spengler’s organisms are metaphors and thus 
neither true nor false . Their value lies in their ability to illuminate “certain 
phases of the historical process” rather than their truth value (Cook 1963: 
314) .
The problem with rationalising Spengler’s inconvenient positivist mo-
ments as metaphors is that it appears to run contrary to Spengler’s description 
of his own system . His description of the life-cycles of culture-organisms does 
not appear to suggest that we are meant to take it to be anything other than 
the description of a genuine historical process:
8 The following analysis applies only to those commentators who have noticed that it is 
somewhat problematic to be a relativist and a positivist at the same time . Others, such as Iggers 
(1984) and Collingwood (1927a, 1927b, 1961) do not seem to view this as an issue .
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The notion of life-duration as applied to a man, a butterfly, an oak, a blade 
of grass, comprises a specific time-value, which is quite independent of all the 
accidents of the individual case… Now, such relations are valid also, and to an 
extent never hitherto imagined, for all the higher Cultures . Every Culture, every 
adolescence and maturing and decay of a Culture, every one of its intrinsically neces-
sary stages and -periods, has a definite duration, always the same, always recurring 
(Spengler 1926: 109–110) .
The culture-organisms themselves are “higher individuals”, each “a self-
contained phenomenon”, “an organism of rigorous structure and significant 
articulation” . Or as Spengler puts it emphatically, “Cultures are organisms” 
(Spengler 1926: 26, 104) . Whilst it is of course possible that Spengler’s talk 
of cultures and their lifecycles is indeed metaphorical, there is little to suggest 
so in the manner that he describes and employs these terms . He speaks with 
what Neurath describes as “austere matter-of-factness” (Neurath 1973: 207) . 
Indeed, Spengler seems to believe quite strongly that the entities and proc-
esses he describes are actual as opposed to figurative or poetic . He states, “(l)et 
the words youth, growth, maturity, decay – hitherto, and to-day more than 
ever, used to express subjective valuations and entirely personal preferences in 
sociology, ethics and aesthetics – be taken at last as objective [my emphasis] 
descriptions of organic states” (Spengler 1926: 26) . With its stress on objec-
tivity and its rejection of the subjective and aesthetic, there seems to be little 
that is metaphorical in Spengler’s depiction of the elements of his historical 
system . Or, if these positivistic aspects are in fact metaphors, it seems to be 
the case that Spengler himself was either unaware of the fact, which seems 
improbable to say the least, or that he very much wanted his readers to think 
otherwise . The balance of probabilities would seem to suggest that Spengler’s 
account was intended to be taken literally .
A second strategy for accommodating the positivistic content of De-
cline is to acknowledge its presence in Spengler’s philosophy of history but 
to downplay its significance . Hughes, for instance, portrays Spengler as the 
more or less unwitting bearer of positivist tropes which had been en vogue in 
the preceding century .9 Hughes favours a relativist interpretation of Spengler’s 
philosophy of history but concedes that there are moments where Spengler is 
an “unwitting positivist” (Hughes 1952: 74) . Spengler’s philosophy of history 
is portrayed as relativist in the main, with the positivist content appearing as 
an aberration, a relic of the author’s cultural Zeitgeist, that is in no way central 
to his philosophical system . Farrenkopf, similarly, acknowledges that there is a 
positivist dimension to Spengler’s philosophy of history . He states that:
9 Hughes states that Spengler’s ‘discovery’ of morphological history “was simply a preten-
tious blowing-up of the biological or botanical metaphor that had haunted the whole nine-
teenth century” (Hughes 1952: 55) .
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Spengler, his own protests to the contrary [my emphasis], with his methodical sys-
tematisation and patternisation of history, was largely nomothetic in approach, 
as were positivist historians . His aspiration to predictive powers also certainly 
places him in proximity to the positivist tradition… He shares the interest of 
many positivist Anglo-Saxon and French social scientists in searching for sig-
nificant regularities and recurrences in history and the desire of some of them 
to imbue social scientific study with a measure of predictive ability” (Farrenkopf 
2001: 84) .
Despite this ‘proximity’ Farrenkopf maintains that Spengler is in fact a thor-
oughgoing relativist and anti-positivist who holds that “history reveals no 
transcendental meaning” and that there are “no eternal truths” (Farrenkopf 
2001: 44) . Farrenkopf argues that Spengler’s positivism is in no way essential 
to the functioning of his philosophy of history and that those aspects of his 
thought that seem most positivistic (the ability to predict future historical 
developments) do not in fact stem solely from Spengler’s “quasi-positivistic 
theory of analogous, structurally comparable cultural cycles” but are in fact 
rooted in his relativistic concept of historical consciousness (Farrenkopf 2001: 
40) . Consequently, jettisoning Spengler’s positivist lapses in no way requires 
us to jettison the notion of historical laws and historical prediction . His phi-
losophy of history functions just as well on purely relativist grounds .10
Thus the ‘pure relativism’ interpretation of Spengler’s philosophy of his-
tory holds that all values (scientific, political, historical, etc .) are historically 
and geographically relative, that there are no trans-cultural values and that 
Spengler’s predictive laws of history are either a rhetorical flourish and there-
fore not to be taken literally, or a regrettable positivistic hiccup to be excised 
and forgotten . either way, the ‘pure relativism’ account is not burdened with 
explaining the possibility of trans-historical laws in Spengler’s philosophy for 
the simple fact that, on this interpretation, there could never be any .
Commentators who interpret Spengler’s philosophy of history in a posi-
tivist manner seem to find its relativism far less problematic than relativist 
interpreters do its positivism . Dray, for example, acknowledges Spengler’s 
relativism, his argument for the meaninglessness of human history and the 
relativism of cultural values, and still maintains that Spengler’s objective with 
his philosophy of history was “to provide us with an analysis that will jus-
tify historical prediction” (Dray 1980: 122) . The obvious question that arises 
here is how exactly one can be a relativist about values and still insist on trans-
cultural historical truths . And, to answer that question, we must consider 
how both the positivist and relativist interpretations believe Spengler grounds 
his historical ‘truth’ claims .
10 I do not find Farrenkopf ’s argument here at all convincing and will return to this topic 
later when considering Spengler’s comparative paradox .
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5.2. Positivism
The positivist interpretation, as we have seen, holds that Spengler argued 
for the existence of laws of history and trans-cultural historical truths . On 
this account Spengler held that there were certain morphological structures 
common to all cultures and that, even though one cannot understand the 
meaning of those structures and their related cultural symbolic content, by 
means of systematic comparative analysis one can from a perspective external 
to the cultures under study and establish objectively the presence of those 
structures . This stems from his view of “every high culture as an organic en-
tity with a life cycle of a determined length and with no purpose beyond its 
unfolding” (Breisach 1995: 398) . One can then chart the order of repetition 
of these structures across cultures and, on the basis of this, develop predictive 
generalisations that enable one to predetermine the future course of an extant 
culture . And this can be done despite cultural isolation and the incommen-
surability of cultural values .
This reading was the most common amongst philosophers of history of 
the mid-20th century critical approach to the philosophy of history and it re-
mains the standard model for those offering condensed versions of Spengler’s 
thought in contemporary reference works .11
5.3. Nomological Relativism
A third interpretation, which one might term ‘nomological relativism’, holds 
that Spengler’s philosophy of history is essentially relativist and also maintains 
that it argues for trans-cultural historical laws which are to be understood as 
universal and true, as opposed to being metaphorical . There are two types of 
nomological relativist interpretation that one finds in the secondary litera-
ture . The first and most common one might term unreflexive or descriptive 
nomological relativism and is typically found in reference works or survey 
articles . The problematic tension between Spengler’s positivism and relativ-
ism is either overlooked or mentioned in passing . Take for instance R .N .D . 
Martin’s encyclopaedia entry for Spengler:
Spengler was an advocate of a cyclical view of history on the basis of a quasi-
biological interpretation of the rise, maturity and decline of cultures . History 
was the story of the rise, maturity and decline of independent cultures between 
which there could be no genuine communication of cultural artefacts (Martin 
1996: 742) .
11 For examples of the former see for instance Gardiner (1952), Collingwood (1961) and 
Kaplan (1978) and the latter, Durant (1968: 89–91) and Dray (1967: 527–530) .
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Martin notes Spengler’s positivist project and scientific/scientistic historical 
laws of cultural change . He also notes Spengler’s cultural isolation thesis, 
the cornerstone of his argument for historical relativism . Spengler’s relativist 
ethos is noted, and Martin suggests the possibility that Spengler had “not 
faced up to the damaging consequences for his own historicist enterprise” 
(Martin 1996: 742) . In other words, Martin identifies the tension between 
Spengler’s relativism and his super-cultural claims for recurrent patterns of 
cultural change . No explanation for this tension is attempted . It is presented 
merely as an idiosyncrasy of Spengler’s philosophy . Tucker too notes Spen-
gler’s positivistic morphological methodology, his “organic cycle of birth, 
maturation, decline and death”, as well as his relativistic cultural isolation 
hypothesis . “Despite their morphological similarities”, Tucker states, “differ-
ent cultures cannot understand each other…” Tucker too notes the tension 
present between Spengler’s relativism and his positivism . On Spengler’s insist-
ence on the impossibility of trans-cultural knowledge, Tucker comments that 
“Spengler’s own brilliant interpretations of other cultures in fact suggest the 
opposite” (Tucker 1998: 861) . Hoover similarly notes Spengler’s “forceful 
system” and details the cyclical pattern and laws of development whilst also 
stating that for Spengler “truth was relative and based solely on the criteria 
of individual cultures” (Hoover 1999: 1138) . Campbell also notes Spengler’s 
“cultural relativism” and then goes on to consider the predictive capacities 
of his historical system based on underlying historical uniformities, “the dis-
covery of the common essence of all cultures and the nature of the periods 
of a life-cycle which they share” (Campbell 1976: 443, 439) . He too notes 
however that, despite Spengler’s relativistic rejection of historical laws based 
on trans-cultural inductive generalisations, “some form of inductive reason-
ing is required to substantiate his claim that all cultures conform to a single 
pattern which lies behind the superficial features of all cultures” (Campbell 
1976: 440) .
Though the more detailed instances of this form of nomological relativ-
ism do acknowledge that there is something problematic in the presence of 
both positivist and relativist elements in his philosophy, they tend to describe 
it rather than analyse it or evaluate its significance for Spengler’s overall posi-
tion . The attempt to do so is what distinguishes the second form of nomologi-
cal relativism . Proponents of what one might consider nomological relativism 
proper note the discordance between Spengler’s cultural relativism and his ar-
gument for trans-cultural models of historical change, and attempt to account 
for the apparent discordance in a way that preserves firstly, a predominantly 
relativist reading of Spengler’s philosophy of history, and secondly the notion 
of historical laws of trans-cultural validity . These laws, on this interpretation, 
are not to be understood as metaphors or poetic devices but as deterministic 
laws of universal validity . This is a position that Farrenkopf seems to adopt . 
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He maintains that Spengler advocated a “systematically grounded relativism” 
and yet developed a “grand methodical system” of history by means of which 
he could “forecast the general lines of future historical development” (Far-
renkopf 2001: 81, 40) .12 The problem for such an interpretation is to explain 
how Spengler can plausibly argue that all historical truths are relative, except 
those that he claims have universal validity . And the attempt to do so must 
accommodate the problem of what I term Spengler’s comparative paradox .
6. The Comparative Paradox
The issue here concerns how, or possibly whether, Spengler justifies his claims 
about the nature of historical truths . I am not concerned here with whether 
the historical claims that Spengler makes in support of his philosophical model 
are historically accurate, but rather with the question of whether his account 
of the way in which we can access historical ‘truth’ is a) coherent and b) com-
patible with any of the afore-mentioned interpretations of his philosophical 
system (pure relativist, positivist and nomological relativist) . The problem that 
besets both positivist and nomological relativist interpretations concerns Spen-
gler’s mode of historical analysis . Spengler advocates the comparative analysis 
of different historical cultures as the appropriate method of historical analy-
sis .13 Spengler uses this firstly, to establish the impossibility of the comparative 
analysis of different historical cultures, and secondly, to justify his meta-his-
torical model of the cyclical nature of cultural organisms .14 Regarding the first 
point, the impossibility of comparative analysis, Spengler is quite explicit: 
“each of the great Cultures… has arrived at a secret language of world-feeling 
that is only fully comprehensible by him whose soul belongs to that Culture . 
We must not deceive ourselves” (Spengler 1926: 178) .15 And again:
We may take… words of Greek and translate them by words of our own like 
‘origin,’ ‘matter’ and ‘form,’ but it is mere imitation, a feeble effort to penetrate 
into a world of feeling in which the finest and deepest elements, in spite of all 
we can do, remain dumb (Spengler 1926: 179) .
12 Farrenkopf differs from many accounts by grounding Spengler’s claims concerning the 
ability of his laws of history to predict future developments not in his comparative analysis of 
cultural structures but in the historical consciousness of Faustian humanity . 
13 I do not think that any Spengler commentator would dispute this statement regarding 
Spengler’s methodology .
14 Again, no Spengler commentator that I have encountered would dispute that these are 
the two main conclusions of Spengler’s comparative analysis of cultures . Disagreement arises 
only among those who recognise the incompatibility of the two conclusions and in the means 
by which they attempt to resolve the paradox .
15 Though, typically, Spengler does not cite him, it is nonetheless likely that he derived 
this view of the hermeneutical inaccessibility of other forms of life from the work of Dilthey .
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In other words, to comprehend the cultural content of a culture one must 
belong to that culture . One cannot grasp the meaning of its symbols from 
the outside .
Regarding the second point, Spengler continuously introduces compari-
sons of different culture-organisms in order to demonstrate the repetition of 
stages in the life-cycle . For example, we are told that there is a correspond-
ence between Classical and Western (Faustian) culture, between “the ‘Trojan 
War’ and the Crusades, Homer and the Niebelungenlied, through Doric and 
Gothic, Dionysian movement and Renaissance, Polycletus and Johann Sebas-
tian Bach, Athens and Paris, Aristotle and Kant, Alexander and Napoleon, 
to the world-city and the imperialism common to both Cultures” (Spengler 
1926: 27) . Here the comparison of the two cultures is used to identify struc-
tural repetitions of events and historical roles at equivalent stages of the two 
cultures’ life-cycles . In other words, this is the comparative morphology that 
Spengler claims will yield the common structural features of all cultures and 
with them the predictive laws of historical development .
Spengler’s position appears to be that comparative analysis of different 
cultures is both impossible and necessary to yield historical laws . The first 
point is necessary for his argument concerning the relativism of values to a 
particular culture, the cultural isolation thesis, and the impossibility of linear 
models of historical change and/or progress . The second point is necessary 
for Spengler’s trans-historical laws concerning the life-cycles of internal cul-
tural development, cyclical nature of cultures, and the prediction of future 
cultural developments .16 A proponent of the positivist interpretation might 
choose to discard the claim concerning the impossibility of cultural analysis, 
and the attendant relativist consequences, in order to salvage the possibility 
of trans-cultural historical truths and historical prediction based upon objec-
tive analysis of regularities in the patterns of cultural change . However, if 
one discards that position, there seems to be no reason to deny the possibil-
ity of inter-cultural communication and the mutual transmission of cultural 
content . And once inter-cultural transmission is conceded, there seems no 
reason to insist on the individuality of cultures, their autochthonous nature, 
their life-cycle or the necessity for cultural death at the end of the life-cycle . 
Indeed, there would be so little left of the key features of Spengler’s philoso-
phy of history, that one would be hard put to recognise it as such . Such an 
interpretation would effectively kill most of what is distinctive in Spengler’s 
philosophy in order to save universal historical laws .
The nomological relativist interpretation, on the other hand, faces the 
problem of explaining how one can establish trans-cultural historical laws 
16 Felken also makes this point (1988: 56) .
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if the comparative analysis of different cultures is not possible . If all values 
are relative to a particular culture, how can one ever ‘step out’ of one’s own 
culture to such a degree as to be able to access another culture? And if one 
cannot, then how could one ever formulate historical laws that hold outside 
one’s own culture?
7. Conclusion
Spengler is best known as a philosopher of history and there exists a general 
consensus on the nature of his historical system and its key claims and con-
cepts . Nonetheless, there is a marked tension within the consensus between 
those interpretations that concentrate on the relativistic aspects of Spengler’s 
thought, those that stress the more positivistic aspects, and those who insist 
on the presence of both . Relativistic interpretations tend to lay emphasis on 
the centrality of the cultural isolation theory to Spengler’s philosophy of his-
tory, whilst positivistic interpretations stress the importance of his trans-cul-
tural laws of history and their predictive powers .
Both positivist and relativist elements are present in Spengler’s philoso-
phy of history and both types appear to play an important role in his histori-
cal model, such that one cannot extract or discard either without significantly 
altering Spengler’s philosophy . Attempts to clarify the correct interpretative 
position on Spengler’s thought are further complicated by the presence within 
his work of what I have termed the comparative paradox and the question of 
the possibility or impossibility of trans-cultural historical truths .
In short, both the positivist and the relativist interpretations fail to save 
Spengler’s historical model and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that his phi-
losophy of history is conceptually incoherent . That regardless of how ‘timely’ 
his prognostications and jeremiads might appear to be, their credibility is 
ultimately dependent on a historico-philosophical model that is itself funda-
mentally flawed . I suggest in closing that, despite its sudden reappearance in 
public debate, Spengler’s philosophy of history should not be revisited, but 
rather declined .17
17 Acknowledgments: I would like to thank all those who made comments on earlier 
versions of this paper, in particular Prof . David Spurrett .
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